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ENFORCEMENT, AND THE 




I.      INTRODUCTION 
 
Surrogacy remains controversial.1 Several states ban commercial 
surrogacy2 while several other states permit it,3 subject to certain 
conditions.4 In addition, many state legislatures simply have not spoken to 
the legality of surrogacy agreements.5  Courts have addressed whether such 
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 1. See Catherine London, Advancing a Surrogate-Focused Model of Gestational Surrogacy 
Contracts, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 391, 393 (2012) (explaining some of the modern 
controversies surrounding surrogacy). 
 2. Austin Caster, Don't Split the Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and 
Unnecessary Litigation and Promote Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 
10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 477, 486 (2011) (“[The] District of Columbia, Indiana, Michigan, 
Nebraska, and North Dakota, have statutes that prohibit surrogacy contracts.”). See also Andrea B. 
Carroll, Discrimination in Baby Making: The Unconstitutional Treatment of Prospective Parents 
Through Surrogacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1187, 1191 (2013) (listing the number of states that banned 
surrogacy after Baby M). 
 3. See Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 210, 232–33 (2012) (discussing different state limits in permitting surrogacy). 
 4. See id. at 233 (describing how some states enforce surrogacy agreements only if the 
intended parents are a married heterosexual couple, while other states only enforce gestational 
surrogacy agreements). See also Paul G. Arshagouni, Be Fruitful and Multiply, by Other Means, If 
Necessary: The Time Has Come to Recognize and Enforce Gestational Surrogacy Agreements, 61 
DEPAUL L. REV. 799, 807 (2012) (explaining that Florida, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
New Mexico, and Washington ban any compensation outside of resaonable living costs, which 
include medical, legal, and mental health expenses). 
 5. See SaraAnn C. Bennett, Comment, “There's No Wrong Way to Make A Family”: 
Surrogacy Law and Pennsylvania's Need for Legislative Intervention, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 407, 
413–14 (2013) (stating that only 18 legislatures have enacted statutes that address surrogacy 
arrangements, and have done so in three different ways: prohibition, inaction, and status 
regulation). 
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contracts are enforceable in individual instances, either as a matter of public 
policy6 or, perhaps, because of a claimed breach of contract.7  
Two of the most well-known surrogacy cases8 are In re Baby M9 and 
Johnson v. Calvert.10 The former struck down a traditional surrogacy11 
agreement while the latter upheld a gestational surrogacy12 agreement.13 
Together, these two holdings suggest a possible compromise, which has 
been endorsed by various commentators.14 Although courts might adopt the 
position that gestational agreements—but not traditional surrogacy 
agreements—are enforceable,15 this is not the only possible view.16 Some 
 
 6. See, e.g., In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (invalidating a surrogacy 
contract because it conflicts with state law and public policy). 
 7. Cf. J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ohio 2007) (suggesting that there may be support 
for a breach of contract claim in gestational surrogacy contract cases). 
 8. See Valarie K. Blake, Ovaries, Testicles, and Uteruses, Oh My! Regulating Reproductive 
Tissue Transplants, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 353, 388–89 (2013). 
 9. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 10. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 11. See Sarah Mortazavi, Note, It Takes a Village to Make a Child: Creating Guidelines for 
International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2253 (2012) (describing traditional surrogacy as a 
procedure where sperm is used to artificially fertilize the birth mother’s own ovum). 
 12. See Tina Lin, Note, Born Lost: Stateless Children in International Surrogacy 
Arrangements, 21 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 545, 550–51 (2013) (describing the process of 
gestational surrogacy, where an embryo is created through in vitro fertilization—meaning the 
sperm and the egg are combined outside of the surrogate’s body—and is then transferred to the 
surrogate’s womb). 
 13. See Jami L. Zehr, Student Article, Using Gestational Surrogacy and Pre-Implantation 
Genetic Diagnosis: Are Intended Parents Now Manufacturing the Idyllic Infant?, 20 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 294, 304–06 (2008) (comparing In re Baby M, holding that the traditional 
surrogacy contracts are illegal, with Johnson v. Calvert, upholding a gestational surrogacy 
contract since it could be used to determine the intent of the parties). 
 14. See Arshagouni, supra note 4, at 844 (taking the opinion that a gestational surrogate 
provides a valuable service to the intended parents of the child); Carroll, supra note 2, at 1192 
(describing how the last decade has brought forth more American acceptance of surrogacy and 
other different forms of assisted reproductive technologies); Michelle Elizabeth Holland, 
Forbidding Gestational Surrogacy: Impeding the Fundamental Right to Procreate, 17 U.C. DAVIS 
J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 1, 19 (2013) (“[T]he state's interest in preventing baby brokering is actually 
supported by legalizing gestational surrogacy agreements.”); Chelsea Van Wormer, Outdated and 
Ineffective: An Analysis of Michigan's Gestational Surrogacy Law and the Need for Validation of 
Surrogate Pregnancy Contracts, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 929 (2012) (stating that Michigan 
should enact new legislation validating gestational surrogacy contracts); see also Radhika Rao, 
Hierarchies of Discrimination in Baby Making? A Response to Professor Carroll, 88 IND. L.J. 
1217, 1218–19 (2013) (noting that the Uniform Parentage Act recommends that gestational 
surrogacy contracts be deemed enforceable and effective to transfer parental rights, but does 
nothing to clarify the legal status of traditional surrogacy). 
 15. See J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (Ohio 2007) (holding that no public policy is 
violated when a gestational surrogacy contract is entered into); see also id. at 742 (stating that a 
gestational surrogate may have a different legal position from a traditional surrogate). 
 16. See In re Baby, No. M2012–01040–COA–R3–JV, 2013 WL 245039 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 
22, 2013) (holding a traditional surrogacy agreement enforceable), appeal docketed, 2013 Tenn. 
App. LEXIS 470 (May 7, 2013). 
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recent court decisions have adopted a different tack,17 and the implications 
of these decisions merit closer examination.  
Part II of this Article traces the development of the jurisprudence 
regarding the enforcement of surrogacy agreements, noting how there 
seemed to be a consensus within the parameters set by state law.18 Part III 
addresses a few recent decisions in which traditional surrogacy contracts 
were enforced, in whole or in part.19 This Article concludes by noting some 
of the counterintuitive implications of these latter decisions and explaining 
how some of these undesirable effects might be avoided.20 
 
II.     THE EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 
SURROGACY CONTRACTS 
 
Over the past several decades, several courts have addressed the 
enforceability of surrogacy contracts.21 Many seemed to follow the lead 
provided by Baby M and Johnson, namely, enforcing gestational but not 
traditional surrogacy agreements.22 While these courts did not explicitly 
adopt this position, the reasoning and results in these cases seemed to 
reflect that view.23 
 
A.     Background 
 
There are two types of surrogacy: traditional and gestational.24 
Traditional surrogacy involves a woman who is artificially inseminated 
with a donor’s or the commissioning father’s sperm.25 Gestational 
surrogacy involves a procedure whereby embryos are created in vitro and 
are later implanted within a surrogate’s uterus.26 Those embryos may have 
 
 17. See, e.g., id. (holding a traditional surrogacy agreement as enforceable). 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part IV. 
 21. See infra Part II.B–C. 
 22. See infra Part II.C. 
 23. See Raftopol v. Ramey, 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011) (holding a gestational surrogacy 
agreement enforceable); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (holding a traditional 
surrogacy agreement unenforceable); J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740 (Ohio 2007) (holding a 
gestational surrogacy agreement enforceable). 
 24. Tiffany L. Palmer, The Winding Road to the Two-Dad Family: Issues Arising in Interstate 
Surrogacy for Gay Couples, 8 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 895, 897 (2011). 
 25. See Mortazavi, supra note 11. 
 26. See id. 
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been created using the gametes of the commissioning couple or, instead, 
may have been created using donor eggs or sperm.27  
Various costs and benefits are associated with these two forms of 
surrogacy. While traditional surrogacy is less expensive and less medically 
complicated than gestational surrogacy,28 the traditional surrogate may be 
more likely to bond with the child she is carrying because she and the child 
are genetically related.29 Further, after birth, the child may look like the 
surrogate’s other children, which might make surrender of the child much 
more difficult.30 In contrast, the gestational surrogate does not have a 
genetic connection to the child she is carrying, which will likely decrease 
the probability that she will bond with the child during the pregnancy.31 
Additionally, after birth, surrender may be less difficult if the child does not 
look like the surrogate’s other children,32 which will make matters go more 
smoothly and which may help avoid future litigation.33 For these reasons, 
among others, gestational surrogacy is both more common34 and more 
accepted than traditional surrogacy.35 
At least one factor influencing whether or which kind of surrogacy is 
used is the degree to which the surrogacy agreement is enforceable.36  State 
 
 27. Bennett, supra note 5, at 412. 
 28. See Alyssa James, Note, Gestational Surrogacy Agreements: Why Indiana Should Honor 
Them and What Physicians Should Know Until They Do, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 175, 
179 (2013) (describing gestational surrogacy as a process that involves significant medical 
procedures and expense). See also Rao, supra note 14, at 1221 (discussing the cheaper and less 
invasive low-tech procedure of artificial insemination).  
 29. See Amy M. Larkey, Note, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in 
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 610 (2003) (explaining how the 
biological connection between a surrogate mother and the child can create a bond between them). 
 30. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1236 (N.J. 1988) (referencing a situation where the 
surrogate mother became upset upon seeing the baby and believing they shared a physical 
resemblance). 
 31. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Summer 2009, at 109, 141 (describing how a gestational surrogate is less likely to form a 
bond with the child because of the lack of a genetic connection). 
 32. Cf. supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 33. Cf. Gaia Bernstein, Unintended Consequences: Prohibitions on Gamete Donor Anonymity 
and the Fragile Practice of Surrogacy, 10 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 291, 308 (2013) (citing the fact 
that U.S. medical practitioners endorse a preference for gestational surrogacy because it is a 
legally safer practice). 
 34. See June Carbone, Negating the Genetic Tie: Does the Law Encourage Unnecessary 
Risks? 79 UMKC L. REV. 333, 337 (2010) (explaining that gestational surrogacy quickly replaced 
traditional surrogacy); Anne R. Dana, Note, The State of Surrogacy Laws: Determining Legal 
Parentage for Gay Fathers, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 353, 363 (2011) (stating that 
gestational surrogacies account for 95% of surrogacy arrangements in the United States). 
 35. Cf. Carroll, supra note 2, at 1191 (describing how gestational surrogate mothers are less 
offended by the arrangement because they have no genetic connection to the child). 
 36. See Lindsey Coffey, A Rights-Based Claim to Surrogacy: Article 23 of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 20 MICH. ST. INT'L. L. REV. 259, 275 (2012) (describing 
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courts differ about the conditions under which such agreements are void 
because it violates an important public policy; no one view has gained 
general acceptance.37  
 
B.     Baby M 
 
In re Baby M38 was one of the first challenges to a surrogacy 
agreement that was decided by a state supreme court.39 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court found that the surrogacy contract was void,40 although it 
upheld the custody award to the biological father.41 
William Stern was married to Elizabeth Stern, who had learned that 
she might have multiple sclerosis and that her carrying a child to term might 
pose significant health risks.42 William Stern and Mary Beth Whitehead 
entered into a contract providing that “through artificial insemination using 
Mr. Stern’s sperm, Mrs. Whitehead would become pregnant, carry the child 
to term, bear it, deliver it to the Sterns, and thereafter do whatever was 
necessary to terminate her maternal rights so that Mrs. Stern could 
thereafter adopt the child.”43 Mary Beth Whitehead was married to Richard 
Whitehead, who was also a party to the contract, and Richard Whitehead 
promised to do all he could to rebut the presumption of paternity.44  
Mary Beth Whitehead’s (“Whitehead”) pregnancy was uneventful, and 
she gave birth to a little girl.45 Whitehead had bonded with the child during 
pregnancy, however, and decided that she could not part with the child.46 
That Whitehead might have difficulty parting with the child had been 
foreseen prior to insemination by a psychologist, although the Sterns had 
not been informed about that possible difficulty.47   
 
how some countries and states have laws restricting the types of surrogacy agreements that will be 
enforceable in that jurisdiction). 
 37. Compare In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (invalidating a surrogacy 
contract because it conflicts with the law and public policy of the state of New Jersey), with In re 
F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 649–50 (Wis. 2013) (holding that the interests supporting enforcement 
are more compelling than the interests against enforcement of surrogacy agreements). 
 38. 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). 
 39. See Keith J. Hey, Assisted Conception and Surrogacy-Unfinished Business, 26 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 775, 787–89 (1993) (discussing a number of cases heard during the 1980s 
wherein state appellate courts avoided directly ruling on the validity of surrogacy contracts).  
 40. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1234. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1235. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 1236. 
 46. Id. at 1236–37. 
 47. Id. at 1247–48.  
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Whitehead turned the child over to the Sterns, but was unable to eat or 
sleep after doing so.48 She went to the Sterns and explained that she was 
disconsolate—if Whitehead could have the child for a week, then she would 
be able to surrender the child.49  The Sterns permitted Whitehead to have 
the child for a week.50  
Rather than return the child once the week had passed, Whitehead fled 
the state.51 Eventually, the Sterns located her and were able to have Baby M 
returned to New Jersey.52  The Sterns then filed to have custody of Baby M, 
to have Whitehead’s parental rights terminated, and to have Mrs. Stern 
adopt Baby M.53  
The trial court upheld the validity of the surrogacy contract, but also 
found that Stern should be awarded custody of the child using a best 
interests analysis.54 The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s best interests analysis and conclusion, but rejected the validity of the 
contract.55 The New Jersey Supreme Court likened the surrogacy contract 
to baby-selling.56 
The New Jersey high court articulated several of its concerns about 
surrogacy, which included the concern that the biological parents are 
deciding who would have custody of the child without considering which 
parent would best promote the interests of the child.57 While the court’s 
point is true, it is misleading. In this case, the child would never have come 
into existence but for the agreement that the Sterns would raise her.58 It is 
thus surprising to suggest that the parents who commissioned the contract 
 
 48. Id. at 1236. 
 49. Id. at 1236–37. 
 50. Id. at 1237. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See id. at 1237–38 (describing that the court found that it was in the best interests of the 
child to return it to the mother and father). 
 55. Id. at 1238.  
 56. See id. at 1241, 1242 (describing the surrogacy arrangement as a private placement 
adoption for money, and referring to surrogacy arrangements as “baby selling” and “baby-
buying”). 
 57. Id. at 1246 (holding that the surrogacy contract’s basic premise bears no relationship to 
the settled law that custody shall be determined by the child’s best interests). 
 58. See Louis Michael Seidman, Baby M and the Problem of Unstable Preferences, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 1829, 1832 (1988) (stating that a child born as a result of a surrogacy contract is substantially 
distinguishable from the child of divorced parents or adopted children because the contract is the 
“but for” cause of the child’s existence). 
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were ignoring the child’s best interests, as if it might have been better for 
the child never to exist than to have been raised by the Sterns.59 
The court also worried that surrogacy was contrary to state public 
policy, in that it was intended to produce a child who would not be living 
with both biological parents.60 Here, too, the court’s point is misleading. 
Many couples have children anticipating that they will raise the child 
together; further, should the parents’ relationship end, the state seeks to 
assure that each parent will continue to play a role in the child’s life.61 In a 
surrogacy arrangement, the commissioning couple envisions raising the 
child together, and in some cases, it might be confusing and harmful if the 
child continues to have contact with the surrogate.62  
The Baby M court reasoned that the “surrogacy contract violates the 
policy of this State[, which is] that the rights of natural parents are equal 
concerning their child, the father’s right no greater than the mother’s.”63 
Yet, merely because the rights of only one parent are terminated hardly 
establishes that the rights of the two parents are not being treated equally 
(depending upon the basis of the termination).  
In the surrogacy context, the surrogate’s parental rights are being 
terminated because of the agreement rather than because the father’s rights 
are of greater value.64 Certainly, there will be times when a court should 
refuse to enforce a promise to surrender parental rights as a matter of public 
policy,65 but the New Jersey high court did a disservice when implying that 
a parent having his or her parental rights terminated must mean that the 
other parent’s rights are being weighed more heavily.  
The Baby M court worried that the surrogate would not be making an 
informed and voluntary decision since she is agreeing to give up the child 
 
 59. See id. (arguing that enforcement of a surrogacy contract maximizes social welfare 
because the potential psychological harm to the mother outweighs the harm associated with the 
child’s nonexistence). 
 60. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1246–47 (N.J. 1988) (holding that the public policy of 
New Jersey is that whenever it is possible, children should be in the custody and care of both of 
their natural parents). 
 61. See Note, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation 
Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J. 1126, 1132 (1978) (discussing how the state seeks to 
maintain the relationship between the child and custodial parent even when the relationship 
between the parents has ended).  
 62. See In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 640 (Wis. 2013) (discussing how expert witnesses 
have stated that it can be harmful for children to have contact with the surrogate that gave birth to 
them). 
 63. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1247. 
 64. Cf. J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E. 2d 740, 741–42 (Ohio 2007) (holding that the the parental rights 
of the surrogate can be terminated via a contract).   
 65. See, e.g., Matos v. Matos, 932 So.2d 316, 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that 
an agreement can be modified by a court if it was made via fraud, deceit, duress, coercion, 
misrepresentation, or overreaching).  
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before knowing the strength of her bond with that child.66 This is exactly 
the wrong test to use. Imagine the possible effects on a child’s self-esteem 
when he is told that his surrogate mother gave him up after having had 
ample time to assess the strength of her bond with him.67  
The court described surrogacy as involving “the sale of a child, or, at 
the very least, the sale of a mother’s right to her child,”68 stating that this 
kind of arrangement implicates “[a]lmost every evil that prompted the 
prohibition on the payment of money in connection with adoptions.”69 Yet, 
this, too, is inaccurate.70 Surrogacy does not involve an individual who 
unwillingly became pregnant and is now pressured to act because she is 
poor and unable to take care of the child herself.71 Instead, in a surrogacy 
arrangement, the pregnancy is planned and the agreement to surrender 
parental rights was made before the onset of the pregnancy.72 Further, in 
many cases, the child is being given to the child’s biological father rather 
than to some stranger who simply bought the child.  
The Baby M court understood that there would be few, if any, 
surrogacy agreements if commercial surrogacy agreements were 
unenforceable because it is against public policy, but seemed to believe that 
society would be better off without surrogacy entirely.73  In another 
surrogacy decision analyzing the enforceability of a gestational surrogacy 
 
 66. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248. 
 67. Cf. Linda Carroll, New Study Tracks Emotional Health of ‘Surrogate Kids’, TODAY (June 
19, 2013, 4:46 AM), http://www.today.com/health/new-study-tracks-emotional-health-surrogate-
kids-6C10366818 (discussing an academic study that suggests that children may struggle with the 
fact that they grew in an unrelated woman’s womb). 
 68. Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See, e.g., In re F.T.R., 833 N.W. 2d 634, 646 (Wis. 2013) (explaining that making certain 
payments to a surrogate may not necessarily implicate the “undue influence” concerns behind 
Wisconsin’s statutory prohibitions on adoptive parents making certain payments to the birth 
mother). 
 71. See, e.g., Angie Godwin McEwen, Note, So You’re Having Another Woman’s Baby: 
Economics and Exploitation in Gestational Surrogacy, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 271, 294 
(1999) (noting that the parties involved in the Baby M case were not poor, had modest incomes, 
and a high level of education). It is true that the Baby M court mentioned income disparity. See 
Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1249 (“Intimated, but disputed, is the assertion that surrogacy will be used 
for the benefit of the rich at the expense of the poor.”). The court admitted, however, that the 
parties in this case do not fit this description. See id. 
 72. See Joanna K. Budde, Comment, Surrogate Parenting: Future Legislation to Eliminate 
Present Inconsistencies, 26 DUQ. L. REV. 633, 640 (1988) (stating that a key part of a surrogacy 
agreement is the relinquishment of parental rights before the birth of the child). 
 73. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1248, 1250 (acknowledging that making commercial surrogacy 
contracts unenforceable will likely lead to the elimination of the practice, and that the harm that 
derives from surrogacy is obvious). 
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contract, the California Supreme Court rejected the theory that surrogacy, as 
a general matter, is contrary to public policy.74 
 
C.     Johnson and Progeny 
 
In Johnson v. Calvert, the California Supreme Court addressed the 
enforceability of a gestational surrogacy agreement. Mark and Crispina 
Calvert were a married couple wishing to have a child.75 Crispina had 
undergone a hysterectomy, and although she could produce eggs, she could 
not sustain a pregnancy.76  
Anna Johnson heard about their plight and offered to act as a 
surrogate.77 Johnson and the Calverts entered into a surrogacy contract, 
whereby Anna agreed to act as a gestational surrogate for the embryos 
created using the Calverts’ gametes and would surrender any rights that she 
had upon the birth of the child she was carrying.78 During the pregnancy, 
however, relations between Ms. Johnson and the Calverts cooled 
considerably.79  
Both Cristina and Anna claimed to be the mother of the child—
Crispina, because of her genetic connection to the child, and Anna, because 
she carried the child to term.80 The California Supreme Court explained that 
because each party had presented acceptable proof of maternity, it was 
necessary to consider the intentions of the parties to determine who was the 
child’s legal mother.81 Reasoning that the pregnancy would never have 
taken place but for Anna’s agreement that Crispina would be the child’s 
mother, the court concluded that where each of the two women can claim 
maternity either by having gestated the child or by having a genetic link to 
the child, then “she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she 
intended to raise as her own—is the natural mother under California law.”82 
Johnson offered some of the arguments that had won the day in Baby 
M, including the argument that surrogacy should be likened to baby-
 
 74. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 785 (Cal. 1993) (holding that surrogacy contracts 
are not a violation of public policy and thus are not unenforceable on public policy grounds). 
 75. Id. at 778. 
 76.  See id. (discussing how Crispina had a hysterectomy and thereby could not get pregnant). 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 781. 
 81. See id. at 781–82 (stating that California law does not recognize more than one mother, 
and as a result, in order to determine custody, it is necessary to look at the intention of the parties 
when forming the surrogacy contract). 
 82. See id. at 782.  
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selling,83 and that the surrogacy contract required her to waive rights before 
she knew the strength of her bond with the child.84 The California Supreme 
Court rejected the idea, however, that surrogacy was appropriately likened 
to adoption for pay, reasoning that because the agreement had been made 
prior to conception, the mother was not being lured by money to give up her 
own child.85 Unlike the Baby M court, which feared that surrogacy would 
likely exploit the poor, the Johnson court thought the economic duress 
implicated here was likely no more destructive than economic duress more 
generally.86  
The Johnson court upheld a gestational surrogacy agreement where the 
gametes had been provided by the commissioning couple.87 Such a holding 
does not entail that a traditional surrogacy agreement is also enforceable, 
and a California appellate court addressed the enforceability of traditional 
surrogacy contracts the year after Johnson was handed down.88 
In re Marriage of Moschetta89 involved Robert and Cynthia 
Moschetta, who contracted with Elvira Jordan (“Jordan”) to perform a 
traditional surrogacy.90 In November 1989, Jordan became pregnant 
through artificial insemination.91 The Moschettas’ marriage began to break 
down a few months later, however, and Robert told his wife in April that he 
wanted a divorce.92 Jordan was informed about the Moschettas’ marital 
difficulties in May while she was in labor, and she delivered the child, 
Marissa, the following day.93 
Jordan began to have second thoughts about letting the Moschettas 
have Marissa, but then relented when they said that they would stay 
together.94 Unfortunately, the marriage did not last.95 Cynthia filed for a 
 
 83. See id. at 783–84 (arguing that surrogacy contracts are unenforceable on the grounds of 
public policy, specifically citing Penal Code section 273, which prohibits payment for adoption of 
a child).  
 84. Id. at 784. 
 85. See id. (holding that because the voluntary arrangement was made before pregnancy, the 
surrogate was not in a vulnerable state when she entered into the contract). 
 86. Compare In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988) (stating that it is far more likely 
for potential surrogates to be amongst the poor than the wealthy), with Johnson, 851 P.2d at 785 
(stating that there is no evidence to support the assertion that low-income women are exploited by 
surrogacy arrangements). 
 87. Id. at 778, 782 (discussing the details of the surrogacy agreement and ultimately 
upholding the agreement). 
 88. See In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding 
that traditional surrogacy agreements are unenforceable). 
 89. Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893. 
 90. Id. at 895. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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legal separation and sought to establish her parental relationship as a de 
facto parent, while Jordan sought to join the dissolution action.96 
The court trifurcated the trial: (1) to decide the parental rights of 
Cynthia and Jordan; (2) to decide custody and visitation; and (3) to decide 
the dissolution of the marriage with respect to matters not involving 
Marissa.97 The court found that Robert and Jordan had parental rights, and 
that each should have joint legal and physical custody.98 Robert appealed, 
challenging the finding that Jordan was the mother, instead claiming that 
Cynthia was Marissa’s mother under the Uniform Parentage Act.99 Robert 
also argued that the surrogacy contract was enforceable.100 
The court noted that Cynthia had not sought to adopt Marissa, and 
indeed, had filed a brief in support of the judgment below (i.e., in support of 
Jordan being declared the mother).101 The court concluded that Jordan was 
the child’s mother and that the surrogacy contract could not be enforced 
against her, although the court remanded the case for a reexamination of the 
custody award.102 
While both the Moschetta and the Baby M courts found that the 
surrogacy agreement was unenforceable against the traditional surrogate,103 
the holdings of each case are nonetheless distinguishable.104 Moschetta 
suggests that such agreements are voidable at the surrogate’s option, and 
the agreement cannot be enforced against her.105 On the other hand, Baby 
M suggests that such agreements are void and unenforceable as a general 
matter.106 This difference is important in other kinds of surrogacy cases 
where the surrogate wishes to enforce the contract against the 
 
 95. See id. (stating that within seven months of bringing Marissa home, Robert left, taking the 
child with him). 
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 895–96. 
 102. Id. at 901–02. 
 103.  See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901 (declining to enforce the traditional surrogacy 
contract); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1240 (N.J. 1988) (holding the entire 
contract unenforceable). 
 104.  Compare Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1240 (suggesting that such agreements are voidable at the 
surrogate’s option), with Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 901 (suggesting that such agreements are 
void and unenforceable as a general matter). 
 105. See Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 900–01 (explaining that a contract giving rise to a 
“traditional” surrogacy arrangement where a surrogate was simply inseminated with the husband's 
sperm could not be enforced against the surrogate by the intended father). 
 106. See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1238 (stating that the contract is “void”). 
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commissioning couple.107 Perhaps the commissioning couple did not pay 
all that was promised,108 or perhaps the couple did not want the child after 
all because the child had severe abnormalities.109  
California jurisprudence developed surrogacy case law further in In re 
Marriage of Buzzanca, which involved a gestational surrogacy arrangement 
where donor gametes were used for the commissioning couple.110 The 
couple separated after the surrogate became pregnant.111 Luanne Buzzanca 
claimed to be the child’s mother, but John Buzzanca argued that he was not 
the child’s father.112  
The trial court agreed with John, concluding that the child had no legal 
parents.113  The court stated that the surrogate who gave birth to the child 
was not the legal mother, and “the genetic contributors [we]re not known to 
the court.”114 Luanne was not the mother because she was not genetically 
related to the child and had not carried the child to term, and John was not 
the father because he had not contributed sperm to help create the child and 
so had no biological relationship to the child.115 The appellate court was 
incredulous, describing the trial court’s conclusion as “extraordinary.”116 
Perhaps in anticipation of the court’s reaction to the holding that Jaycee had 
no legal parents, John argued that the woman who gave birth to Jaycee was 
her legal parent.117 
John claimed support for his position by citing Johnson, where the 
California Supreme Court had used the intentions of the parties as a 
tiebreaker for determining legal maternity when only one of the contenders 
was genetically related to the child, and the other was the woman who 
 
 107. See Katherine Drabiak et al., Ethics, Law, and Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for 
Uniformity, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 300, 303 (2007) (discussing the state differences between 
surrogacy law and contracts).  
 108. See Steven L. Miller, Comment, Surrogate Parenthood and Adoption Statutes: Can a 
Square Peg Fit into a Round Hole?, 22 FAM. L.Q. 199, 210 (1988) (stating that if the couple 
breaches their contract by failing to pay the surrogate, then the surrogate may sue the couple for 
both the price of the contract, and expenses and the service fee). 
 109. See William Joseph Wagner, The Contractual Reallocation of Procreative Resources and 
Parental Rights: The Natural Endowment Critique, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 139 n.620 (1990) 
(noting the parties each refused to accept custody of the child because the infant suffered from 
microcephaly). 
 110. 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
 111. Id.  
 112. See id. (noting that while Luanne claimed to be the mother, in John’s petition for 
dissolution of marriage, he alleged that there were no children of the marriage). 
 113. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 282. 
 114. Id. at 282, 284.  
 115. Id. at 282. 
 116. Id.  
 117. See id. at 288 (discussing John's argument that the court should declare the surrogate as 
the lawful mother). 
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delivered the child.118 In response, the Buzzanca court reasoned that the 
California Supreme Court had said that maternity may be established by 
showing genetic connection or that the woman had delivered the child,119 
but had not said that those were the only ways to establish maternity.120 
Ultimately, the Buzzanca court rejected John’s argument: Luanne should 
not be considered Jaycee’s mother, analogizing Luanne to the husband who 
consents to artificial insemination and then is held legally responsible for 
the child thereby produced:121  
 
If a husband who consents to artificial 
insemination under section 7613 is “treated in law” as the 
father of the child by virtue of his consent, there is no 
reason the result should be any different in the case of a 
married couple who consent to in vitro fertilization by 
unknown donors and [the] subsequent implantation into a 
woman who is, as a surrogate, willing to carry the embryo 
to term for them.122  
 
Artificial insemination is dis-analogous to gestational surrogacy 
(where donated gametes are used) in that one of the spouses has a genetic 
connection to the child in the former,123 and neither spouse has any genetic 
connection to the child in the latter.124 The court viewed Luanne’s lack of 
gestational or genetic role as “irrelevant” because the artificial insemination 
“statute contemplates the establishment of lawful fatherhood in a situation 
where an intended father has no biological relationship to a child who is 
procreated as a result of the father’s (as well as the mother’s) consent to a 
medical procedure.”125 
 
 118. Id. at 284–85. See also Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) (holding that 
where the Act recognizes two different women as a possible legal mother, the court will look to 
the intention to raise the child as her own to determine legal maternity). 
 119. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rept. 2d at 284 (noting that the court in Johnson held that genetic 
consanguinity was proof of maternity, just like evidence of giving birth). 
 120. See id. (explaining that the Johnson court did not say that only proof of birth or genetics 
would be sufficient to establish maternity).  
 121. See id. at 288 (explaining that Luanne’s motherhood may be established by virtue of the 
consent, like a husband in an artificial insemination case whose consent triggers the pregnancy 
and eventual birth; therefore she is the legal mother). 
 122. Id. at 286. 
 123. See id. at 285 (noting that in artifical insemination, the wife may be inseminated artifically 
with semen donated by another man that is not her husband). 
 124. See id. at 282 (stating that in this case, the child had no genetic connection to either 
spouse). 
 125. Id. at 288. 
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Moschetta might seem to preclude a holding that Luanne was the 
mother—the Moschetta court had suggested that Cynthia could not be the 
mother of the child born to Jordan because Cynthia was not genetically 
related to the child and had not delivered the child.126 The Buzzanca court 
distinguished that case, however, by noting that “[i]n Moschetta, this court 
held that a contract giving rise to a ‘traditional’ surrogacy arrangement 
where a surrogate was simply inseminated with the husband’s sperm could 
not be enforced against the surrogate by the intended father.”127 In contrast, 
here, there was a gestational rather than a traditional surrogacy.128 Further, 
neither the woman who had donated the egg nor the woman who had 
delivered the child was seeking custody.129 
Baby M, Johnson, Moschetta, and Buzzanca taken together suggest 
that while gestational surrogacy agreements may be enforceable, traditional 
surrogacy agreements will not be enforceable against the surrogate.130 That 
analysis is given further support in R.R. v. M.H.,131 which involved an 
attempt to enforce a traditional surrogacy agreement.132 The biological 
father and his wife created a traditional surrogacy contract with the 
surrogate.133 Pursuant to an agreement, a child was conceived via artificial 
insemination.134  During the sixth month of pregnancy and after having 
received partial payment, the biological mother changed her mind about 
parting with the child.135  
Unlike what had occurred in Baby M,136 the biological mother in R.R. 
had been psychologically evaluated, and the psychologist thought it was 
 
 126. Cf. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d, 893, 900 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (citing 
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993)) (holding that parentage is easily resolved in Elvira 
Jordan because the surrogate had the two usual means of showing maternity—genetics and birth). 
 127. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288.  
 128. See id. at 291 (noting that this was a “gestational surrogacy case”). 
 129. Id. at 290. 
 130. See id. at 293 (enforcing a gestational surrogacy contract against the divorcing husband 
who denied being baby’s father); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (upholding a 
gestational surrogacy agreement where the gametes had been provided by the commissioning 
couple); In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 901 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that 
the surrogacy agreement was unenforceable against the traditional surrogate); In re Baby M, 537 
A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (holding the traditional surrogacy agreement to be unenforceable). 
 131. R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) (holding that the surrogacy agreement 
between the father and surrogate mother was unenforceable). 
 132. See id. at 791 (summarizing that in this case, a child was conceived through artificial 
insemination based on a surrogate parenting agreement, providing that the father would have 
custody and the surrogate would receive funds). 
 133. See id. (noting that both the mother and the father were married to others and had 
executed a surrogate parenting agreement). 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1247–48 (N.J. 1988) (noting that psychological 
evaluation of the surrogate indicated that she might have difficulty surrendering the child). 
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unlikely that the biological mother would have difficulty in surrendering the 
child.137 Once the mother decided to keep the child, she returned a check 
for $3,500 to the father,138 although she did not return the other money that 
the father had previously sent to her for pregnancy related costs.139 
Notwithstanding the contractual specification that Rhode Island law would 
govern140 (which was where the father lived141), the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts decided the case in light of Massachusetts law.142 
The court found that the agreement was unenforceable143 because the 
couple used money to coerce the surrogate into the contract.144  
J.F. v. D.B. involved a gestational surrogacy agreement where 
embryos created from the donor’s eggs and J.F.’s sperm were implanted in 
D.B., eventually resulting in the birth of triplets.145 J.F. and D.B. then had a 
custody dispute, and J.F. sued D.B. for breach of contract.146 The trial court 
found that the surrogacy agreement was unenforceable because it required 
D.B. to surrender parental rights, and because it allowed J.F. to recoup any 
child support payments that he was ordered to make.147 The intermediate 
court reversed,148 and the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the intermediate 
appellate decision.149  The court explained that “[a] written contract 
defining the rights and obligations of the parties seems an appropriate way 
to enter into surrogacy agreement. If the parties understand their contract 
rights, requiring them to honor the contract they entered into is manifestly 
right and just.”150 
 
 137. R.R., 689 N.E.2d at 792. 
 138. See id. at 793 (explaining that in May, the father’s lawyer sent the surrogate a check and 
that the surrogate responded by saying she had changed her mind and wanted to keep the child, 
and returned the check in June). 
 139. See id. (noting that while the mother returned one check, she made no attempt to refund 
any pregnancy-related expenses).   
 140. Id. at 792. 
 141. Id. at 791. 
 142. See id. at 795 (noting that the court used the law of Massachusetts because it was where 
the mother is a resident and where the child was conceived and born). 
 143. See id. at 796 (holding that statutory prohibitions of paid adoption suggest that a contract 
for payment in exchange for custody should be given no effect in deciding the custody of the 
child).  
 144. See id. (explaining that the agreement was void because the surrogate was induced with 
money). 
 145. 879 N.E.2d 740, 740 (Ohio 2007). 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 740–41. 
 149. Id. at 742.  
 150. Id. at 741. 
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While upholding the enforceability of gestational surrogacy 
agreements, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly limited its decision.151 The 
court stated that it would be “remiss” if it were to fail to mention that 
gestational surrogacy and traditional surrogacy implicate different legal 
issues.152 Because the case at hand did not involve a traditional surrogate, 
the court did not address whether traditional surrogacy was against public 
policy.153 
In Raftopol v. Ramey, the Connecticut Supreme Court also addressed 
the enforceability of gestational surrogacy agreements.154 The plaintiffs, 
Anthony Raftopol and Shawn Hargon, were domestic partners who entered 
into a gestational surrogacy agreement with Karma Ramey.155 Prior to the 
expected birth date of the twins, Raftopol and Hargon sought a declaratory 
judgment enforcing the agreement and declaring that they were the legal 
parents of the children, and that Ramey was not.156 Following a hearing, the 
trial court found that: “(1) the gestational agreement is valid; (2) Raftopol is 
the genetic and legal father of the children; (3) Hargon is the legal father of 
the children; and (4) Ramey is not the genetic or legal mother of the 
children.”157 The Department of Public Health appealed.158 
The Connecticut Supreme Court explained that Connecticut “statutes 
and case law establish that a gestational carrier who bears no biological 
relationship to the child she has carried does not have parental rights with 
respect to that child.”159 The court considered the argument that only 
genetic parents can acquire parental rights by virtue of a gestational 
agreement,160 but noted that such a holding would lead to negative 
“consequence[s], which [are] . . . so absurd as to be Kafkaesque.”161 The 
court described the “Kafkaesque” results if such arguments were valid: 
 
Suppose [there is] an infertile couple who desire to have 
children but cannot supply the womb, the eggs, or the 
sperm . . . . These intended parents would need to rely on 
third party egg and sperm donors to produce embryos that 
 
 151. See id. at 741–42 (noting in its holding that while not relevant to the case, a gestational 
surrogate not involving her own egg may be different from traditional surrogates). 
 152. Id. at 742. 
 153. Id. 
 154. 12 A.3d 783 (Conn. 2011).  
 155. Id. at 787. 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. at 788. 
 158. Id. at 786. 
 159. Id. at 789.  
 160. Id. at 796. 
 161. Id. at 797. 
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are implanted in a gestational carrier pursuant to a 
gestational agreement. If § 7–48a confers parental status 
only on biological intended parents, the intended parents 
are not the parents of any resulting child, nor are the 
gestational carrier, any spouse she may have, the gamete 
donors, or any spouses each may have. Every possible 
parent to the child would be eliminated as a matter of law, 
yielding the result of a child who is born parentless, not due 
to the death of the parents, but simply due to elimination by 
operation of law.162 
 
The Raftopol court nowhere noted that its imagined absurd 
hypothetical reflected the reasoning and result offered by the Buzzanca trial 
court.163 Nor did it note that the Buzzanca intermediate appellate court had 
similarly believed that such a holding and result was simply 
“extraordinary.”164  
Where permitted to do so by statute,165 many courts have enforced 
gestational surrogacy contracts, sometimes reserving judgment about the 
enforceability of traditional surrogacy contracts.166 That left the 
enforceability of traditional surrogacy agreements an open question, 
although that approach also suggested that these courts viewed the two 
types of surrogacy as dissimilar, and therefore subject to different legal 
treatment. Some recent decisions suggest, however, that the two kinds of 
surrogacy agreements will be treated much more similarly than had 




 162. Id.  
 163. See generally id. at 783.  
 164. See generally id. 
 165. Some statutes expressly preclude the enforcement of such agreements. See id. at 802 
n.37 (“Ten states prohibit compensated gestational agreements, including Florida, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Virginia and 
Washington.”).  
 166. See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., 879 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ohio 2007)  (“[W]e would be remiss to leave 
unstated the obvious fact that a gestational surrogate, whose pregnancy does not involve her own 
egg, may have a different legal position from a traditional surrogate, whose pregnancy does 
involve her own egg . . . .”). 
 167. See e.g., In re Baby, No. M2012–01040–COA–R3–JV, 2013 WL 245039, (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Jan. 22, 2013) (affirming the validity of  a traditional surrogacy agreement in which the surrogate 
gave up her parental rights), appeal docketed, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 470 (May 7, 2013); In re 
F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 638 (Wis. 2013) (holding that the traditional surrogacy agreement is 
valid aside from the termination of parental rights provision because that provision was prohibited 
by state law). 
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III.     A NEW TREND IN SURROGACY CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT? 
 
Recently, one Minneapolis court enforced many of the provisions of a 
traditional surrogacy agreement without speaking to its validity,168 while a 
Wisconsin court expressly enforced most, but not all, of such an 
agreement’s provisions,169 while still another court enforced such an 
agreement in its entirety.170 It is difficult to tell whether these decisions 
reflect a new trend, but if so, states may have to clarify or rethink their 
approaches to a variety of family law issues. 
 
A.     A.L.S. 
 
A.L.S. ex rel. J.P. v. E.A.G. involved the enforceability of a traditional 
surrogacy agreement between a surrogate and a gay couple that was made 
following the surrogate’s advertisement for surrogacy services.171 A child 
was born (“A.L.S.”), who was released to the couple.172  E.A.G., the 
surrogate, twice visited A.L.S. in the home of R.W.S. and B.C.F., consistent 
with the plan to have ongoing contact between her and the child.173 
Sometime after the second visit, however, E.A.G. had a change of heart and 
refused to voluntarily surrender her parental rights.174 When she next 
visited, she tried to take A.L.S.175 The police were called, and the police 
left the child with R.W.S. and B.C.F.176 
R.W.S. and B.C.F. proposed an open adoption agreement, which 
would have included visitation arrangements for E.A.G.177 E.A.G. refused, 
and later sued to establish R.W.S.’s paternity, alleging that A.L.S. was the 
product of coital relations.178 E.A.G. sought sole custody and child support 
 
 168. See A.L.S. ex rel. J.P. v. E.A.G., No. A10-443, 2010 WL 4181449, at *5  (Minn. Ct. App. 
Oct. 26, 2010) (unpublished opinion) (declining to address the validity of the surrogacy contracts 
not addressed by the trial court).   
 169. See F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 638 (Wis. 2013) (holding that the Parentage Agreement is an 
enforceable contract, with the exception of the contract’s termination of parental rights provisions, 
as long as the contract’s enforcement is not contrary to the child’s best interests).  
 170. See In re Baby, 2013 WL 245039, at *5 (explaining that the best interests analysis does 
not apply if there is a valid surrogacy contract since the surrogate has given up her parental 
rights). 
 171. See E.A.G., 2010 WL 4181449, at *1. 
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.   
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.   
 178. Id. 
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from R.W.S.179  R.W.S. admitted paternity, sought sole legal and physical 
custody, standby custody for B.C.F., and child support from E.A.G.180 In 
addition, R.W.S. sought to enforce the surrogacy agreement.181 
There was a bench trial, and both the guardian ad litem and the 
custody evaluator recommended that the child’s best interests would be 
served by according R.W.S sole legal and physical custody.182 The trial 
court held that E.A.G. was not the child’s legal mother,183 adjudicated 
B.C.F. as a legal parent of their daughter, A.L.S., and awarded sole legal 
and physical custody to B.C.F. and R.W.S.184 
The Minnesota appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling that 
E.A.G. should be likened to an egg donor, instead finding that she was the 
child’s biological and legal mother.185 The court further overruled the 
designation of B.C.F. as one of the child’s parents.186 The court, however, 
upheld the trial court’s award of sole physical and legal custody to 
R.W.S.187 The appellate court noted that “while B.C.F. is and will continue 
to be an important person in the child’s life, he is not a legal or biological 
parent of A.L.S. under Minnesota law and is not entitled to custody of the 
child on the facts of this case.”188 The Minnesota appellate court expressly 
refused to address the enforceability of the traditional surrogacy 
agreement.189 
Several questions were left unanswered in this case, and there was no 
remand to clarify some of these issues.190 The trial court had found that 
E.A.G. was not A.L.S.’s mother.191 In addition, the court had expressed 
concern that it might be harmful to A.L.S. if E.A.G. were to have 
 
 179. Id.   
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  
 183. Id. at *2. 
 184. Id.  
 185. See id. at *2–3 (disagreeing with the district court that E.A.G. falls under the definition of 
an egg donor, which would preclude her from being a biological or legal parent under the 
Parentage Act). 
 186. See id. at *4 (concluding that B.C.F. is not A.L.S.’s biological father under the Parentage 
Act (“PA”)). 
 187. Id. at *7. 
 188. Id.  
 189. See id. at *5 (concluding that the question of the contract’s enforceability is not properly 
before this court). 
 190. See id. at *9 (indicating that the disposition of the appeal did not include a remand). 
 191. Id. at *2.  
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unsupervised visitation with the child, based on reports of E.A.G.’s conduct 
during supervised visitation while this matter was on appeal.192  
At least one issue that would need to be resolved would be whether 
E.A.G.’s supervised visitation should continue and, if so, whether it should 
continue with the same limitations that the court had previously imposed.193 
E.A.G. suggested that the trial court had been biased against her, although 
the appellate court rejected that contention.194  Assuming that the trial 
court’s visitation order would continue, E.A.G. could eventually seek a 
modification if she could show a substantial change in circumstances,195 
although the trial court may not have envisioned its order as continuing 
indefinitely, given its finding that E.A.G. was not the child’s legal parent. 
R.W.S. had sought child support from E.A.G.,196 which would not 
have been granted in light of the finding that E.A.G. was not A.L.S.’s legal 
parent. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s holding regarding 
parental status,197 however, which might make child support again at issue. 
Or, E.A.G. might be told that child support would become an issue if 
E.A.G. were to seek more contact with the child.198 That said, the trial court 
had believed that E.A.G. was asserting her parental rights as a way to 
receive child support.199 
R.W.S. had sought to have B.C.F. awarded “standby custody,”200 
presumably to assure that B.C.F. would have legal custody of A.L.S. should 
 
 192. See id. at *5–6 (describing E.A.G.’s financial motives and indications of mental and 
emotional instability as cause for concern for any unsupervised contact she may have with the 
child). 
 193. See id. (discussing E.A.G.’s behavior during supervised visits as a consideration used to 
make detailed findings regarding the statutory custody factors). 
 194. See id. at *9 (finding that the court did not believe that the district court judge showed 
bias towards E.A.G.). 
 195. See MINN. STAT. § 518.18(d) (2013) (“[T]he court shall not modify a prior custody order 
or a parenting plan provision which specifies the child's primary residence unless it finds, upon the 
basis of facts, including unwarranted denial of, or interference with, a duly established parenting 
time schedule, that have arisen since the prior order or that were unknown to the court at the time 
of the prior order, that a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or the parties and 
that the modification is necessary to serve the best interests of the child.”). 
 196. E.A.G., 2010 WL 4181449, at *1. 
 197. See id. (reversing the district court’s parentage determination).  
 198. Sometimes, parents seek more visitation time to reduce child support. See D. Kelly 
Weisberg, Professional Women and the Professionalization of Motherhood: Marcia Clark's 
Double Bind, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 295, 335 (1995) (“[F]athers may demand sole or joint 
custody, or increased visitation, because they hope to lessen the amount of their child support.”). 
Here, however, the threat that child support might be sought might deter E.A.G. from seeking 
more contact. 
 199. See E.A.G., 2010 WL 4181449, at *6 (citing the district court’s observations, E.A.G. 
intended to receive child support in addition to keeping the money she was paid through the 
contract). 
 200. Id. at *1. 
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anything happen to R.W.S. The Minnesota appellate court, however, denied 
that B.C.F. had parental status under Minnesota law.201 If something were 
to happen to R.W.S., then E.A.G. would be the sole legal parent of 
A.L.S.202  While B.C.F. might be able to seek visitation in that event,203 it 
seems clear that the effect of the Minnesota appellate court decision posed 
potential difficulties for all concerned parties. 
 
B.      F.T.R. 
 
In In re F.T.R., the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed the 
enforceability of a traditional surrogacy agreement between the Roseckys 
and the Schissels.204 The agreement specified that Monica Schissel would 
be a traditional surrogate for the Roseckys.205  
Marcia Rosecky was unable to have children because of leukemia 
treatments.206 Knowing this, Monica offered to act as a surrogate for the 
Roseckys, an offer that the Roseckys eventually accepted.207 The couples 
discussed using donor eggs, “but decided to use Monica’s egg because they 
could be sure of Monica’s family history, there was a higher chance of 
having multiples using a donor egg, and Monica preferred to use her own 
egg.”208 When Marcia expressed her fear that Monica would have difficulty 
giving up a child to whom she was genetically related, Monica assured her 
that there would be no such difficulty.209 The parties thoroughly discussed 
the ramifications of the surrogacy agreement.210 Each couple retained 
counsel, and the terms of the agreement were negotiated.211  
Monica became pregnant through artificial insemination, but shortly 
before the child’s birth, she informed the Roseckys that she was unwilling 
to surrender him.212 When the child was born, Monica sought custody and 
 
 201. Id. at *4. 
 202. See id. at *3, *6 (ruling that E.A.G. and R.W.S. are A.L.S.’s only two legal parents, and 
that B.C.F. is not A.L.S.’s legal parent—thus, if something were to happen to R.W.S., A.L.S.’s 
only legal parent would be E.A.G.). 
 203. See MINN. STAT. § 257C.08 (Subd. 4.) (2013) (stating that if an unmarried minor who has 
lived with a person other than a foster parent for two years or more and no longer lives with that 
person, that person may petition for reasonable visitation rights for as long as the child is a minor). 
 204. In re F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 637 (Wis. 2013). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 638. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 638–39. 
 212. Id. at 637–38. 
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placement of F.T.R.213 David Rosecky sought enforcement of the Parentage 
Agreement (“PA”), where Monica had agreed to the termination of her 
parental rights.214 
The trial court found that the PA was unenforceable, although it 
awarded sole custody and primary placement to David, with Monica 
receiving secondary placement.215 David appealed.216 The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court concluded that “[a]side from the termination of parental 
rights provisions in the PA at issue, . . . a PA is a valid, enforceable contract 
unless enforcement is contrary to the best interests of the child.”217 
The circuit court held separate hearings to determine temporary 
custody and placement on the one hand, and the enforceability of the PA on 
the other.218 At the former hearing, both the individual doing the custody 
evaluation and the guardian ad litem recommended that David be awarded 
custody, and that Monica should not have any placement.219 The custody 
evaluator worried that awarding custody to Monica would be destructive 
because Monica wanted F.T.R. to view her, rather than Marcia, as his 
mother, which would be very confusing to him.220 In addition, the couples 
were unable to work with each other since their relationship was “‘beyond 
high conflict’ even though the parties did not swear or yell at each 
other.”221 
Both David and the guardian ad litem argued that surrogacy 
agreements were presumptively enforceable because that would help 
provide stability and predictability.222 David also sought to estop the 
Schissels from contesting the agreement because the Schissels had said that 
there was no need to get donor eggs, and the Roseckys had relied on that 
statement to their detriment.223 
Perhaps fearing that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would not enforce 
the surrogacy agreement, David also argued that it was not necessary to 
terminate Monica’s rights “to effectuate the parties’ overall intent[, which 
is] for the Roseckys to be the parents of F.T.R., with full custody and 
placement.”224 With this, David suggested that even if the court were to 
 
 213. Id. at 638. 
 214. Id. at 638–39. 
 215. Id. at 638. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 639. 
 219. Id. at 640.  
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. at 640–41. 
 222. Id. at 647. 
 223. Id.  
 224. Id.  
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find that the agreement to terminate parental rights was unenforceable, the 
termination of the parental rights provision of the agreement was severable, 
and the remainder of the agreement could be enforced.225 The Wisconsin 
court accepted that analysis, concluding that “[a]side from the termination 
of parental rights provisions, . . . the PA is a valid, enforceable contract 
unless enforcement is contrary to the best interests of F.T.R.”226  
The Wisconsin court reasoned that “the interests supporting 
enforcement of the PA are more compelling than the interests against 
enforcement.”227 The court further explained that the policy behind 
enforcement of surrogacy agreements is that it “promotes stability and 
permanence in family relationships because it allows the intended parents to 
plan for the arrival of their child, reinforces the expectations of all parties to 
the agreement, and reduces contentious litigation that could drag on for the 
first several years of the child’s life.”228  
Yet, this opinion also left some matters unsettled.229 Monica’s parental 
rights were not terminated,230 which presumably meant that she retained 
rights of visitation as long as that visitation would be beneficial231 or, 
perhaps, not harmful232 to the child. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, 
however, obviously did not envision Monica having robust rights of 
visitation.233 The court noted disapprovingly that the “circuit court awarded 
primary custody and placement to David and secondary placement to 
Monica,” and remanded because “the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by excluding the PA, and [by] rendering its custody and 
placement decision without consideration of the PA.”234 The court quoted 
language in the surrogacy agreement, which specified that that the Schissels 
would relinquish all parental and visitation rights, and that the Roseckys 
 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 648–49. 
 227. Id. at 649. 
 228. Id. at 650. 
 229. See infra notes 271–74 and accompanying text (discussing how the failure to terminate 
Monica’s parental rights presumably left her with visitation options that the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court had not intended). 
 230.  See F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 651 (noting the court’s reasoning that the portions of the PA 
calling for the termination of Monica’s parental rights were unenforceable under the existing 
statute). 
 231. Id. at 648 (citing the court’s reasoning that the PA is valid unless enforcement is not in the 
best interest of F.T.R.). 
 232. See id. (noting that Monica argued that WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)(b) prevents a court from 
precluding placement with a parent only after a hearing and determination that placement with 
that parent would endanger the child’s health).  
 233. See id. at 652 (noting that the circuit court had erroneously failed to consider the PA when 
determining custody and placement of the child). 
 234. Id. 
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would be “sole legal parents.”235 With the court’s holding though, Monica 
was still a legal parent,236 so the question is what this status conferred.237 
At the very least, it meant that Marcia was not F.T.R.’s legal parent;238 an 
unresolved issue, however, involved the conditions under which Monica 
would have visitation and how extensive that visitation might be.239 
Further, it is unclear what would happen if David Rosecky died and both 
Marcia and Monica sought custody. 
The F.T.R. court suggested that the PA is enforceable “unless 
enforcement is contrary to the best interests of F.T.R.”240 Would it be in 
F.T.R.’s best interests to visit with Monica? That might depend upon 
whether Monica would attempt to undermine the Roseckys’ ability to 
parent.241 Regardless of how that was decided in this case, in subsequent 
cases, a commissioning couple would be on notice that visitation might be 
ordered if a judge thought that visitation would be in the child’s best 
interests. This possibility undermines the Wisconsin court’s contention that 
its holding “reinforces the expectations of all parties to the agreement, and 
reduces contentious litigation that could drag on for the first several years 
of the child’s life.”242   
Monica would not be ordered to pay support, notwithstanding her 
status as a legal parent, because included within the PA was a provision 
specifying that there was to be “no child support to be paid by [the 
Schissels].”243 Absent such a provision in the agreement, however, it is not 
clear whether a judge might order child support.244 Although the Wisconsin 
 
 235. Id. at 665 n.12 (noting language in the PA that required the Schissels to waive any claims 
to custody, visitation, and physical placement of the child, the Roseckys to be the sole legal 
parents, and the Roseckys’ home to be the sole parental home). 
 236. See id. at 651 (holding that the portions of the PA agreement that required Monica to 
terminate her parental rights were unenforceable under the language of the existing statute).  
 237. See infra note 280 and accompanying text (noting that there were questions regarding 
Monica’s parental status over F.T.R.).  
 238. See F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 646 (holding that under the current statutory scheme, Marcia is 
left without any parental rights unless and until Monica terminates her own parental rights). 
 239. See infra notes 283–84 and accompanying text (noting that Monica’s visitation could 
depend on whether Monica attempted to undermine the Roseckys parenting, despite contentions of 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court that the agreement should minimize litigation early in the child’s 
life). 
 240. F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 652. 
 241. See id. at 640 (noting Dr. Huebner’s testimony that placement with Monica would be 
harmful to F.T.R. because of Monica's desire to replace Marcia as his mother, which would be 
confusing for F.T.R.). 
 242. Id. at 649–50 (noting that the Wisconsin Supreme Court believed that the best interests of 
F.T.R. would be served by enforcing the PA and thereby creating stability among the parties, and 
denying the opportunity for potentially long-term litigation).  
 243. Id. at 665 n.12. 
 244. See WIS. STAT. § 767.511 (2014) (discussing when child support will be ordered in the 
state of Wisconsin). 
  
2015] TRADITIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS 109 
court believed that it was clearing up a variety of issues regarding surrogacy 
agreements by promoting stability and predictability and reducing further 
litigation,245 it is clear that there will likely be further litigation in surrogacy 
cases, thus undermining the desired predictability and stability.  
 
C.     Baby 
 
In re Baby246 raised still other issues. At issue in this case was a 
traditional surrogacy agreement.247 Prior to the birth of the child, all parties 
sought a declaration of parentage and a ratification of the surrogacy 
agreement.248 The juvenile court granted the petition.249 The child was born 
on January 12, 2012, and all of the parties agreed that it would be best for 
the child to remain with the surrogate so that the surrogate could nurse the 
baby for a few days.250 After those few days had passed, the surrogate 
sought to prevent removal of the child.251 
The surrogate argued that Tennessee law contemplates surrogacy 
arrangements only in the context of the child being surrendered to the 
biological father and his wife.252 Because the commissioning couple did not 
marry until a few weeks after the birth of the child, the child could not be 
relinquished at birth to the biological father and his spouse.253 The 
surrogate argued that there had been no surrogate birth.254 Neither the trial 
court nor the intermediate appellate court believed that this technicality 
 
 245. See F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d at 649–50 (noting that the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the 
enforcement of the surrogacy agreement promoted stability and permanence in family 
relationships because it allows the intended parents to plan for the arrival of their child, reinforces 
the expectations of all parties to the agreement, and reduces contentious litigation that could drag 
on for the first several years of the child's life). 
 246. No. M2012–01040–COA–R3–JV, 2013 WL 245039, (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2013), 
appeal docketed, 2013 Tenn. App. LEXIS 470 (May 7, 2013). 
 247. Id. at *1. 
 248. Id.  
 249. See id. (stating that the petitions to modify parentage were granted and the juvenile court 
issued a final order declaring parentage, ratifying the surrogacy agreement, and directing the 
issuance of a birth certificate).   
 250. Id. at *2.  
 251. See id. (noting that the surrogate filed for a restraining order and injunction prohibiting 
the child from being taken out of the country, and calling for the surrender of the child’s passport). 
 252. See id. at *5 (quoting Tennessee’s statutory definition of surrogate birth as “[t]he 
insemination of a woman by the sperm of a man under a contract by which the parties state their 
intent that the woman who carries the fetus shall relinquish the child to the biological father and 
the biological father's wife to parent”) (emphasis added). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-
102(48)(A)(ii).   
 253. See In re Baby, 2013 WL 245039, at *2 (noting that the intended parents were not actually 
married until January 27, 2012, a full twenty days after the child’s birth). 
 254. See id. (noting that in each motion, the surrogates argued there was no “surrogate birth” 
because the intended parents were not yet married). 
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justified voiding the agreement, given that the surrogate had long known 
about the marital status of the parties, and had nonetheless accepted money 
to be a surrogate.255 The Tennessee appellate court concluded that the 
“[s]urrogate’s last-minute change of heart does not provide a reason to 
invalidate the final judgment approving the surrogacy contract.”256 
In this case, the couple may very well have married to take away a 
possible ground for invalidating the surrogacy agreement, but it is simply 
unclear whether their having done so was the reason that the surrogate’s 
challenge to their parenthood was unsuccessful.257 On the one hand, the 
surrogate had known that the couple was unmarried and had still accepted 
payment,258 which would have provided some reason to issue that same 
decision even if the couple had not married.259 On the other hand, the trial 
court suggested that “[i]t would be absurd to adopt the position that this was 
not a surrogate birth because the Intended Parents were married 20 days 
after the birth of the child.”260 This suggests that the couple’s decision to 
marry had been given some weight.261 
The Tennessee appellate court did not adopt the line offered by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, where the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that 
the agreement was enforceable except insofar as parental rights were to be 
terminated.262 Instead, the Tennessee appellate court enforced the 
agreement even with the foreseeable result that the surrogate would never 
see the child again, if only because the family would be in Italy.263  
The Baby court faced a difficult task because the Tennessee 






 255. Id. at *5. 
 256. Id.    
 257. See infra notes 313–15 and accompanying text (noting that legislation and court holdings 
have failed to clarify issues regarding the Baby decision).  
 258. In re Baby, 2013 WL 245039, at *5.  
 259. See id. (noting that the surrogate parents’ last-minute position change was not based on 
new information regarding the intended parents’ marital status, and therefore should not serve as a 
reason to invalidate the surrogacy agreement). 
 260. Id. 
 261. See id. (noting the court’s recognition that the couple had married within a few weeks 
after the child’s birth, and were not, in fact, two single parties seeking to raise a child). 
 262. Compare id. (holding there was nothing present in the current case to warrant invalidating 
the surrogacy agreement between the surrogate parents and the intended parents), with In re 
F.T.R., 833 N.W.2d 634, 652 (Wis. 2013) (holding that the PA is an enforceable contract with the 
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 263. See In re Baby, 2013 WL 245039, at *6.  
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Surrogate birth” means: 
 
(i) The union of the wife’s egg and the husband’s sperm, which are 
then placed in another woman, who carries the fetus to term and who, 
pursuant to a contract, then relinquishes all parental rights to the child to the 
biological parents pursuant to the terms of the contract; or 
 
(ii) The insemination of a woman by the sperm of a man under a 
contract by which the parties state their intent that the woman who carries 
the fetus shall relinquish the child to the biological father and the biological 
father’s wife to parent; 
 
(B) No surrender pursuant to this part is necessary to terminate any 
parental rights of the woman who carried the child to term under the 
circumstances described in this subdivision (48) and no adoption of the 
child by the biological parent(s) is necessary; 
 
(C) Nothing in this subdivision (48) shall be construed to expressly 
authorize the surrogate birth process in Tennessee unless otherwise 
approved by the courts or the general assembly.264 
 
(A)(i) discusses gestational surrogacy and (A)(ii) discusses traditional 
surrogacy.265 (B) suggests that neither termination of parental rights nor 
adoption is necessary in the event that a surrogate birth occurs,266 but (C) 
suggests that this section does not authorize surrogacy “unless otherwise 
approved by the courts or the general assembly.”267 The legislature has not 
taken subsequent action to authorize surrogacy,268 although the legislature 
has also not taken any action declaring such agreements illegal or 
 
 264. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A)–(C) (2010).  
 265. See § 36-1-102(48)(A)(i)–(ii) (defining surrogate birth as either “the union of the wife's 
egg and the husband's sperm, which are then placed in another woman, who carries the fetus to 
term and who, pursuant to a contract, then relinquishes all parental rights to the child to the 
biological parents pursuant to the terms of the contract,” or “the insemination of a woman by the 
sperm of a man under a contract by which the parties state their intent that the woman who carries 
the fetus shall relinquish the child to the biological father and the biological father's wife to parent 
. . . .”).   
 266. See § 36-1-102(48)(B) (stating that a surrogate mother who carries a baby to term does 
not need to surrender her parental rights, nor do the intended parents need to adopt the child for a 
transfer of parental rights to occur). 
 267. See § 36-1-102(48)(C) (suggesting that only the courts or general assembly can approve a 
surrogate birth process in Tennessee). 
 268. See In re Baby, 2013 WL 245039, at *4 (noting that the court had been unable to find, and 
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contracts).  
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unenforceable.269 Because the legislature had defined the differing kinds of 
surrogacy, but had done nothing to indicate which was contrary to public 
policy, the intermediate appellate court “decline[d] to find such agreements 
to be against public policy,”270 and instead opted to “enforce [such 
contracts] until the legislature instructs otherwise.”271 
At this point, it is simply unclear what to make of Baby, especially 
because the Tennessee Supreme Court has granted permission to appeal.272 
Nonetheless, the court’s willingness to wholly enforce a traditional 
surrogacy contract stands in sharp contrast to the position spelled out in 
Baby M a little over 25 years ago.273 
 
IV.     CONCLUSION 
 
Up until recently, courts enforced gestational, but not traditional 
surrogacy contracts.274 In the past few years, however, a few courts have 
effectuated the terms of such contracts, sometimes in addition to upholding 
their validity in whole or in part.275 It is simply unclear whether these few 
decisions are outliers or, instead, reflect a modification of previously 
existing trends. 
If courts are going to be partially enforcing such contracts, courts will 
need to be much clearer about a variety of matters. Suppose, for example, 
that such contracts are enforceable except with respect to the termination of 
parental rights. Courts will have to explain what the surrogate’s “parental 
rights” entail. Would the surrogate be liable for child support assuming that 
the contract did not address that issue?  Or, perhaps, would the surrogate be 
liable for child support if the contract included a provision stating that she 
would be liable for such support if she refused to surrender her parental 
rights? As a general matter, states promote visitation with a noncustodial 
parent, absent a showing that such visitation would be harmful.276 Courts or 
legislatures will have to explain whether the same rules apply with respect 
 
 269. See id. (discussing Tennessee’s neutral legislative stance towards surrogacy agreements as 
well as public policy). 
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to traditional surrogates. If they do not, then much more will have to be said 
regarding what it means to enforce all provisions except for the agreement 
to terminate parental rights. Included within such a specification must be 
what rights the surrogate would have with respect to custody or visitation if 
the other biological parent were to die or have his own parental rights 
terminated. 
The Baby M court was concerned that surrogates might be subject to 
exploitation.277 In both F.T.R.278 and A.L.S.,279 the surrogate had offered 
her services, just as had been true in Johnson,280 presumably undercutting 
the concern that the surrogates in those cases had somehow been coerced 
into performing the surrogacy. While courts have not expressly suggested 
that an important consideration in granting or denying the surrogate’s 
parental rights is whether the surrogate made the initial offer, this factor 
may play a role in the courts’ resolution of the issues. If that is so, then it 
would be helpful for courts to make this aspect of their decisions clear. 
Predictability is important for all parties in surrogacy arrangements, 
and courts must consider some of the foreseeable difficulties that will arise 
when holding that the surrogate’s parental rights cannot be terminated, 
while at the same time expressly or impliedly denying that the surrogate has 
many of the rights normally associated with parenthood. Such legal 
positions are open invitations for further litigation, claims to the contrary 
notwithstanding.   
Should traditional surrogacy agreements be enforceable as a matter of 
public policy? That is unclear. What is clear is that courts partially 
enforcing such agreements must clarify the various implications of their 
holdings, or else courts will neither promote predictability nor the interests 
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